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Abstract   
 
In this paper we empirically investigate the determinants of acquisition likelihood in 
the EU banking industry, using a sample of 672 commercial banks operating in the EU, 168 of 
which were acquired between 1998 and 2002. Using industry-adjusted financial ratios, we 
evaluate the relative influence of bank-specific and market characteristics by estimating a 
logistic regression model both with and without the additional factors that reflect the market 
environment in which banks operate. The results indicate that banks with less risky asset 
portfolios, and banks that are less profitable and less efficient in terms of expenses 
management, are more likely to be acquired. With regard to the market characteristics, the 
factors having a significant impact on the acquisition likelihood are the growth of the market, 
as measured by the annual change in total assets, the change in the country’s overall economic 
environment, the level of concentration in the banking industry, and the location of the bank 
in one of the 5 principal EU banking sectors. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) have significantly transformed the European 
banking industry in recent years. For example, the number of European banking institutions 
fell from 12,378 in 1990 to 8,395 in 1999 (European Central Bank - ECB, 2000) while 18 of 
the 30 largest European banks emerged as a result of recent M&As (Belaisch et al., 2001). 
Beitel and Schiereck (2001) also point out that during the period 1998-2000 more M&As 
deals occurred in the EU banking industry than during the previous 14 years.  
Nevertheless, empirical evidence related to bank M&As in the EU is in general 
limited. Recent studies have examined the influence of M&As on the scale and operating 
efficiency of the merging institutions (Vander Vennet, 1996, 1998; Huizinga et al., 2001; Diaz 
et al., 2004; Altunbas and Ibanez, 2004), the effect of M&A announcements on the share 
prices of the financial institutions (Tourani Rad and Van Beek, 1999; Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia, 2000; Beitel and Schiereck, 2001; Beitel et al., 2004; Lepetit et al., 2004), and the 
impact on the takeover premium paid (Dunis and Klein, 2005).  With the exception of a few 
recent studies1 there has been limited research on the investigation of the determinants of bank 
M&As in the EU countries, and thus our knowledge of acquisition likelihood characteristics 
that may be distinguished as bank specific or market related comes mostly from studies 
conducted for the US banking industry (Hannan and Rhoades, 1987; Moore, 1996; Hadlock et 
al., 1999; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000, 2004). 
According to the literature on corporate control, M&As may occur because of the 
desire for the acquirer to increase market power, replace inefficient management, achieve 
economics of scale and scope, or diversify risk, among others. Hence, bank specific 
                                                     
1A  s t u d y  o f  t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  b a n k  a c q u i s i t i o n s  h a s  r e c e n t l y  b e e n  e x a m i n e d  f o r  I t a l y  ( F o c a r e l l i  e t  
a l . ,  1 9 9 9 )  a n d  G r e e c e  ( P a s i o u r a s  a n d  Z o p o u n i d i s ,  2 0 0 6 ) .  V a n d e r  V a n n e t  ( 1 9 9 8 )  a l s o  i n v e s t i g a t e s  s o m e  
o f  t h e  c a u s e s  a n d  c o n s e q u e n c e s  f o r  E U  b a n k s ,  a n d  f i n d s  t h a t  t a r g e t s  a r e  s m a l l e r  a n d  l e s s  e f f i c i e n t  t h a n  
a c q u i r i n g  b a n k s .   S o m e  r e c e n t  s t u d i e s  h a v e  a l s o  e x a m i n e d  b a r r i e r s  i n f l u e n c i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c r o s s -
b o r d e r  M & A s  ( F o c a r e l l i  a n d  P a z z o l o  2 0 0 1 ;  B u c h  a n d  D e Lo n g ,  2 0 0 4 ;  R o s s i  a n d  V o l p i n ,  2 0 0 4 ) .   O u r  
s t u d y  f o c u s e s  o n  b a n k  M & A s  i n  t h e  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n ,  w i t h  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k  a c q u i s i t i o n s  
i n  o u r  s a m p l e  b e i n g  d o m e s t i c  r a t h e r  t h a n  c r o s s - b o r d e r .  
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characteristics that could potentially influence bank acquisition likelihood include managerial 
efficiency (e.g. profits maximization or costs minimization considerations), size (i.e. potential 
economies of scale and scope, too-big to fail incentives, too-big to be acquired incentives), 
market share, loan activity, asset quality, and capital strength. Of course non-financial 
characteristics such as corporate governance characteristics and managerial incentives could 
be particularly important as well, due to non-value maximizing motives for M&As.  
The empirical evidence from previous studies, however, is not conclusive. For 
example, Moore (1996), Focarelli et al. (1999), and Wheelock and Wilson (2000) find 
evidence of an association between poor performance (measured either in terms of profits or 
cost management or both) and acquisition likelihood, in contrast to Hannan and Rhoades 
(1987) and Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2006) who reveal no such effect. Hannan and Rhoades 
(1987) and Moore (1996) also find the effect of size to be insignificant, while Wheelock and 
Wilson (2000, 2004) and Focarelli et al. (1999) document a significant relationship. Hannan 
and Rhoades (1987) find growth to be positively related to inside market acquisitions and 
negatively related to outside market acquisitions (albeit insignificant in the latter case), in 
contrast to Moore (1996) who finds a negative relationship between growth and acquisition in 
both in-market and out-of market acquisitions.   
Apart from bank specific characteristics, there are various external factors that can 
influence bank M&As, including industry concentration, market liquidity, market profitability, 
financial regulation, financial deepening, and the size and growth of the banking industry (e.g. 
Berger et al., 1999; Group of Ten, 2001; Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001; Buch and DeLong, 
2004; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Wheelock and Wilson, 2004; Harford, 2005; Giovanni, 2005). 
However, with the exception of Wheelock and Wilson (2004), most of the US studies have 
focused on investigation of bank specific characteristics with only a limited range of external 
factors included (mainly concentration and market growth). Our empirical investigation 
considers a set of 22 financial variables representing 8 bank-specific characteristics, and 9 
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variables representing different aspects of market characteristics comprising the banking 
industry2.  By examining these influences for a sample of commercial banks covering 15 EU 
countries, we hope to shed light upon the determinants of bank acquisition activity in the EU 
as a single market. 
Our examination of the determinants of commercial bank acquisition likelihood in the 
EU is important for several reasons.  First, such studies in the banking industry have in 
general been neglected (Cyree et al., 2000; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000). Although there is 
ample empirical evidence linking the relationship between financial characteristics and 
acquisition likelihood of industrial firms (e.g. Levine and Aaronovitch, 1981; Harris et al., 
1982; Hasbrouck, 1985; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Powell, 1997), it has been claimed 
that bank managers may be involved in M&As for reasons different than those of non-bank 
managers (Hannan and Rhoades, 1987). Furthermore, some proxies typically employed in 
empirical studies of M&As for industrial firms (i.e. current ratio) may not be meaningful for 
banks (Fields, 2004), and the need to investigate various bank specific characteristics affecting 
the likelihood of bank acquisition is therefore important.  
Second, the European banking industry differs from that of the US in many respects 
(Tourani Rad and Van Beek, 1999; Beitel and Schiereck, 2001), not least because it is more 
heterogeneous due to cultural, legal and economic differences between the EU member states, 
but there have traditionally also been restrictions on both geographic and product expansion in 
the US, whereas the universal banking structure in the EU offers greater opportunity for a 
wider range of products (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000; Diaz et al., 2004). Another aspect in 
which EU differs from the US is the social environment where powerful European labor 
unions and laws offer more protection to employees, making it almost impossible to lay off 
                                                     
2T a b l e  2  b e l o w  o u t l i n e s  t h e  s e t  o f  v a r i a b l e s  g r o u p e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e s e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  w h i c h  t y p i c a l l y  
r e p r e s e n t  t h e  b a n k i n g  i n d u s t r y .    
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employees immediately after completion of merger, which delays cost savings. Obviously, 
such differences between the two markets make it difficult to extrapolate any conclusions 
drawn from US studies onto the EU ones (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000; Huizinga et al., 
2001; Diaz et al., 2004).  
 Third, as Altunbas and Ibanez (2004) point out, the process of banking 
integration in the EU is not yet complete and there are at least three factors that might alter the 
emerging structure of corporate control in the EU banking industry. First, many of the global 
forces underlying the need for banks to be competitive and efficient, such as deregulation, 
technological change and financial globalization, will continue to play an important role in 
asset allocation within the EU economy, thereby influencing the market for corporate control 
through M&As. Second, the number of banks per 1,000 inhabitants in the EU is almost double 
the number in the US, indicating significant scope for convergence as suggested by the 
literature on corporate control (Coffee, 1999; Rossi and Volpin, 2004). Third, there are 
significant differences in levels of concentration among the EU countries themselves. All 
these forces suggest the need to investigate bank specific and market characteristics likely to 
affect bank acquisitions in the EU, which is the focus of this paper.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the research 
methodology, while Section 3 presents our empirical results.  Finally, Section 4 outlines the 
concluding remarks and suggests some possible directions for future research.  
 
2. Research Methodology  
2.1. Sample Selection 
Three data sources were used to provide our sample of information on banks 
acquisitions and bank-specific characteristics: Bankscope, and Zephyr databases of Bureau 
van Dijk’s company, and BANKERSalamanac.com. Claessens et al. (2001) refer to 
Bankscope as the most comprehensive database that allows cross-country comparisons of 
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financial ratios. However, while Bankscope and BANKERSalmanac.com provide information 
about full acquisitions, we had to rely on Zephyr for the identification of banks subject to 
majority acquisitions (purchase above 50% of the ownership of the acquired bank but less 
than 100%).  Hence, our list of majority acquisitions is based critically on the availability (as 
well as accuracy) of such information in Zephyr.  To avoid comparison problems associated 
with different types of banks (e.g. co-operative, investment, etc) whilst providing coverage of 
15 EU countries (the former EU15), we restricted our sample to commercial banks (as defined 
in Bankscope).  
Data availability in the online version of Bankscope (to which we had access) is quite 
limited prior to 1995. In addition, we had to impose the requirement that banks had financial 
data for three years prior to the year of acquisition, in order to ensure adequate use of data in 
the years preceding the acquisition.  Hence, our search for commercial bank acquisitions has 
to be limited to the period between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2002 (the last complete 
year for which data was available when this study was carried out).  This gave a total of 168 
acquired commercial banks, each matched on the basis of the year of acquisition with three 
non-acquired (control) banks.   A corresponding matched sample of 504 banks was therefore 
chosen randomly from 566 non-acquired banks that had financial data over the period 1995-
20023.  
Table 1 presents the coverage of acquired and non-acquired banks in the sample, 
classifying them by year and country.  The estimation dataset comprises this pooled sample of 
672 commercial banks on which we utilize a set of financial and market related ratios 
reflecting the motives and prior evidence to support acquisition likelihood in the banking 
                                                     
3
 M a t c h i n g  c r i t e r i a  a s  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  m o s t  s t u d i e s  c a n  b e  b a s e d  o n  t i m e ,  s i z e  o r  i n d u s t r y .  A m o n g  t h e s e ,  
m a t c h i n g  b y  t i m e  ( i . e .  y e a r )  i s  m o s t  c o m m o n .  G i v e n  t h a t  o u r  s a m p l e  o f  b a n k s  i s  d r a w n  a c r o s s  d i f f e r e n t  
c o u n t r i e s ,  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  c r i t e r i o n  c o u l d  b e  o n  t h e  c o u n t r y  b a s i s .  H o w e v e r ,  a s  H a s b r o u c k  ( 1 9 8 5 )  n o t e s ,  
o n c e  a  v a r i a b l e  i s  u s e d  a s  a  m a t c h i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  i t s  e f f e c t  w i l l  p e r f o r c e  b e  e x c l u d e d  f r o m  t h e  
a n a l y s i s .   H e n c e  w e  r u l e d  o u t  m a t c h i n g  t h e  s a m p l e  b y  c o u n t r y ,  s i n c e  t h i s  w o u l d  h a v e  p u r g e d  c o u n t r y -
s p e c i f i c  e f f e c t s  a n d  d i s a l l o w e d  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  m a r k e t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .   W e  a l s o  r u l e d  o u t  m a t c h i n g  b y  
s i z e ,  s i n c e  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  s i z e  i s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e  i n f l u e n c i n g  
a c q u i s i t i o n s  a n d  i s  t h e r e f o r e  i n c l u d e d  a s  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i n  o u r  m o d e l .   
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industry, with the dependent variable taking the value 1 for 168 banks acquired, and 0 for 566 
banks non-acquired. Pooling of such data across several years to obtain the requisite sample 
for estimation purposes has been a common practice followed in the literature (e.g. Harris et 
al., 1982; Hasbrouck, 1985; Hannan and Rhoades, 1987; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; 
Hadlock et al., 1999; Powell, 1997; Focarelli et al., 1999; Pasiouras and Zopounidis, 2006).  
However, what we estimate below is essentially a cross-sectional logit model where 
appropriate observations for each bank in the sample enter only once4. 
Table 1 – Banks in sample by country and year 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total  
  AC
Q 
NAC
Q 
AC
Q 
NAC
Q 
AC
Q 
NAC
Q 
AC
Q 
NAC
Q 
AC
Q 
NAC
Q 
AC
Q 
NAC
Q 
Aus t r i a  2  2  0  3  0  4  1  4  1  5  4  1 8  
B e lg ium 3  1  0  3  3  6  0  1  3  7  9  1 8  
Denmar k  0  5  2  1 1  2  1 0  3  5  3  1  1 0  3 2  
F in land  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  2  2  3  
F r ance  1 0  2 0  9  2 6  7  4 1  3  2 3  6  1 8  3 5  1 2 8  
Ger many 3  1 3  3  1 5  4  3 0  5  1 1  1  1 2  1 6  8 1  
Gr eece  0  1  3  1  4  2  0  0  1  1  8  5  
I r e l and  0  2  1  1  0  6  0  1  0  1  1  1 1  
I t a ly  1  8  5  7  1 4  7  3  9  9  1 3  3 2  4 4  
Lu x e mb o u r g  1  5  1  6  7  1 9  7  7  2  1 1  1 8  4 8  
N e t h e r l a n d s  0  2  1  4  1  9  0  2  0  4  2  2 1  
P o r tuga l  0  0  0  0  4  3  2  4  0  2  6  9  
Sp a in  3  3  3  4  6  1 5  1  8  4  6  1 7  3 6  
Swed en  0  1  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  1  3  
UK 1  9  1  6  3  1 5  1  7  1  1 0  7  4 7  
T o ta l  2 4  7 2  2 9  8 7  5 6  1 6 8  2 8  8 4  3 1  9 3  1 6 8  5 0 4  
No te s :  ACQ =  acq u i r ed ;  NACQ=no n-acq u i r ed  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4T he  ad o p t io n  o f  t he  un ive r sa l  b ank ing  mo d e l  b y the  Eur o p ean  Unio n  und e r  i t s  seco nd  
b ank ing  d i r ec t ive ,  imp lemented  in  1 9 9 2 ,  and  ha r mo niza t io n  o f  b ank ing  l aws  in  the  
s ing le  mar ke t  p r o v id es  a  r a t io na le  fo r  p o o l ing  o f  t he  d a t a ,  a l tho ugh  i t  i s  a ckno wled ged  
 9  
2.2 Variables  
The covariates of the logit model represent bank specific financial characteristics as 
well as market characteristics that affect the probability of acquisition. Table 2 lists the set of 
explanatory variables reflecting those attributes of banks’ performance associated with their 
acquisition likelihood.  
 
2.2.1 Financial characteristics   
Following Weelock and Wilson (2000, 2004), we consider numerous financial ratios 
to reflect capital strength, asset quality, expenses management, earnings and liquidity. 
However, there are inevitable restrictions on the type of ratios one can use in a pan-European 
setting, and to minimize possible bias arising from different accounting practices, only broad 
variable definitions as provided in Bankscope are used. Bankscope compiles all data on the 
basis of financial statements and notes found in audited annual reports. Each country in the 
Bankscope database therefore has its own data template, thus allowing for differences in the 
reporting and accounting conventions. The data are then converted to a “global format” using 
a standardized template derived from the country-specific templates. This global format 
contains standard ratios that are henceforth comparable across banks and countries. To adjust 
further for potential biases in comparing cross-sectional ratios spanning over several years and 
across countries, we used industry relative ratios (Platt and Platt, 1990; Barnes, 1990) by 
dividing the (raw) financial ratio for each bank by the average ratio for the commercial 
banking industry in the country, according to the formula  
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
t ha t  t he se  mar ke t s  may no t  ye t  b e  we l l  i n t egr a t ed .   Hence ,  we  a l so  t e s t  o ur  r e su l t s  wi th  
co un t r y-sp ec i f i c  ( and  t ime)  d ummy va r i ab le s  to  j us t i fy  o ur  ap p r o ach .   
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Bank’s Country-Adjusted value of ratio
 
X in year t = Bank’s raw value of ratio X in 
year t / Average value of ratio X in the commercial banking industry of the country where the 
bank operates in year t 
 
Standardizing as such using country averages also controls for the mean shift in the 
cross-sectional ratios, particularly where such ratios are computed over different years for 
different banks5.  
The bank specific characteristics represented by the set of 22 industry relative financial 
ratios listed in Table 2 include, in addition to CAMEL-type attributes, other factors such as 
size, growth, and market share, as typically examined in previous studies (e.g. Hannan and 
Rhoades, 1987; Moore, 1996; Pasiouras and Zopounidis, 2006; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000, 
2004). The discussion that follows briefly outlines their relation to some of the motives and 
associated evidence on bank M&As. 
                                                     
5Since acquisitions often take some time to complete, we averaged all independent variables (financial and 
market measures) over two fiscal years prior to the acquisition year (assuming that financial characteristics that 
make a bank attractive are evident in the years prior to the acquisition). Thus, for acquisitions completed during 
year t, we used data on banks’ and market characteristics averaged over years t-1 and t-2.   
 
 11  
Table 2 – List of variables 
B a n k s ’  f i n a n c i a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s   
  
C a p i t a l  S t r e n g t h   E q u i t y  /  T o t  A s s e t s   E Q A S  
 E q u i t y  /  N e t  Lo a n s   E Q LO A N  
 E q u i t y  /  C u s t  &  S T  F u n d i n g   E Q C U S T  
 E q u i t y  /  L i a b i l i t i e s   E Q LIA B  
 C a p  F u n d s  /  L i a b i l i t i e s   C A P LIA B  
S i z e  T O T A L A S S E T S  S IZ E  
G r o w t h  T o t a l  A s s e t s  C h a n g e  G R O W T H  
A s s e t  Q u a l i t y  Lo a n  Lo s s  P r o v  /  N e t  In t  R e v   P R O V IS  
P r o f i t a b i l i t y  N e t  In t e r e s t  M a r g i n   N IM  
 N e t  In t  R e v  /  A v g  A s s e t s   R E V A S  
 O t h  O p  In c  /  A v g  A s s e t s   O T H O P IN C  
 N o n  O p  I t e m s  &  T a x e s  /  A v g  A s t   N O P IT E M S  
 R e t u r n  O n  A v g  A s s e t s  ( R O A A )   R O A A  
 R e t u r n  O n  A v g  E q u i t y  ( R O A E )   R O A E  
 R e c u r r i n g  E a r n i n g  P o w e r   R E C E A R N  
E x p e n s e s  m a n a g e m e n t  N o n  In t  E x p  /  A v g  A s s e t s   E X P A S S  
 C o s t  T o  In c o m e  R a t i o   C O S T IN C  
L i q u i d i t y   N e t  Lo a n s  /  T o t  A s s e t s   LO A N A S  
 N e t  Lo a n s  /  C u s t  &  S T  F u n d i n g   LO A N F U N D  
 L i q u i d  A s s e t s  /  C u s t  &  S T  F u n d i n g   L IQ F U N D  
M a r k e t  p o w e r   Lo a n  M a r k e t  S h a r e   LO A N S H A R E  
 D e p o s i t s  M a r k e t  S h a r e  D E P S H A R E  
M a r k e t  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s    
 A v e r a g e  R e t u r n  o n  a s s e t s  f o r  
c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k i n g  s e c t o r  f o r  e a c h  
c o u n t r y  
M P R O F  
 A n n u a l  c h a n g e  o f  c o m m e r c i a l  
b a n k i n g  s e c t o r  ‘ s  t o t a l  a s s e t s   
M G R O W  
 A v e r a g e  l i q u i d  a s s e t s  t o  c u s t o m e r  &  
s h o r t  t e r m  f u n d i n g  r a t i o  f o r  
c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k i n g  s e c t o r  f o r  e a c h  
c o u n t r y  
M LIQ  
 A n n u a l  c h a n g e  o f  H e r i t a g e  
E c o n o m i c  S c o r e  
O E N V C H  
 H e r i t a g e  B a n k i n g  &  F i n a n c e  F a c t o r  B E N V  
 S t o c k  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  t o  G D P   S M C G D P  
 B a n k  c l a i m s  o n  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  t o  
G D P  
C LA IM S  
 C o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  5  l a r g e s t  
c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y   
C O N C  
 D u m m y  v a r i a b l e  t a k i n g  t h e  v a l u e  o f  
1  f o r  b a n k s  o p e r a t i n g  i n  o n e  o f  t h e  
p r i n c i p a l  b a n k i n g  s e c t o r s ,  a n d  z e r o  
o t h e r w i s e  
5 E U  
T h e  d a t a  f o r  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  b a n k  f i n a n c i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  M P R O F ,  M G R O W ,  
M LIQ  a n d  C O N C  w e r e  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  B a n k s c o p e  D a t a b a s e .  T h e  d a t a  f o r  O E N V C H  a n d  B E N V  
w e r e  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  H e r i t a g e  F o u n d a t i o n .  T h e  d a t a  f o r  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  e x t e r n a l  f a c t o r s  w e r e  
o b t a i n e d  f r o m  E u r o m o n i t o r  In t e r n a t i o n a l  D a t a b a s e  w h i c h  u s e s  s o u r c e s  s u c h  a s   In t e r n a t i o n a l  
M o n e t a r y  F u n d ’ s  ( IM F )  In t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  S t a t i s t i c s  ( IF S ) ,  In t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  
S t a t i s t i c s  a n d  W o r l d  E c o n o m i c  O u t l o o k / U N / n a t i o n a l  s t a t i s t i c s  a n d  W o r l d  B a n k .   
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Capital strength 
The importance of capital adequacy requirements for banks has long been emphasized by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Therefore, not surprisingly, prior studies for the 
US suggest that capital strength may influence the acquisition decision, and invariably report a 
negative relationship between capital ratios and acquisition probability (Hannan and Rhoades, 
1987; Moore, 1996; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000). Two possible explanations have been 
offered for this finding. First, a lack of capital strength tends to attract acquirers who can 
infuse capital into the acquired banks (Moore, 1996; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000). Second, 
acquirers are interested in the purchase of banks with skillful managers who are able to 
operate successfully with high leverage (Wheelock and Wilson, 2000).  
In the present study, we consider a total of 5 capital ratios, intended to measure slightly 
different aspect of banks’ capital strength, as commonly used in recent studies. The first is the 
equity to assets ratio (EQAS), which measures the amount of protection offered to the bank by 
its equity, and is one of the basic capital strength ratios whose use dates back to the early 
1990s (Golin, 2001). The second ratio, equity to net loans (EQLOAN), measures the equity 
available to absorb losses on a bank’s loan portfolio. The third, equity to customer & short 
term funding (EQCUST), provides a measure of the amount of permanent funding (i.e. equity) 
relative to short term potentially volatile funding (i.e. customer & short term funding).  The 
fourth, equity to liabilities (EQLIAB), provides a slightly different picture of the equity 
funding of the balance sheet. Finally, capital funds to liabilities ratio (CAPLIAB), which is 
similar to EQLIAB but with hybrid capital and subordinated debt added to shareholders’ 
equity as a proportion of liabilities (the denominator being common to both).  
 
Size 
A bank’s size may have a negative influence on its acquisition likelihood for several reasons. 
First, large banks are generally more expensive to be acquired. Second, larger banks have 
 13  
greater resources to fight an unwanted acquisition. Third, it is often seen to be more difficult 
for a large bank to be absorbed in the acquirer’s organization. The empirical evidence on the 
U.S. literature, however, is mixed. Hannan and Rhoades (1987) and Moore (1996) find the 
effect of size to be insignificant. Wheelock and Wilson (2000), however, report that smaller 
banks are more likely to be acquired than larger ones, and Wheelock and Wilson (2004) find 
that the probability of engaging in mergers increases with bank size. Focarelli et al. (1999) 
reports a significant negative effect of size (measured by total assets) on acquisitions in Italy, 
while Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2006) find a negative, although not robustly significant, 
effect of size in Greece (using total assets or the number of bank’s branches). In line with 
previous studies, we measure a bank’s size by its total assets, and expect it to be negatively 
related to acquisition likelihood.  
 
Asset quality 
Asset quality refers mainly to the quality of the bank’s earning assets, the majority of which 
make up its loan portfolio (credit risk), although securities portfolio (market risk) and off-
balance sheet items are also considered. Golin (2001) argues that “the challenge for bank 
management is to minimize the risk of loan defaults and to price loans so that returns are 
more sufficient to cover loan losses” (p.166).  This would seem to imply that prudent banks 
with less risky portfolios are less prone to takeovers. Again the evidence is inconclusive. 
Wheelock and Wilson (2000) found that U.S. banks with relatively high non-performing loan 
ratios were less attractive takeover targets over the period 1984-1993; whereas Wheelock and 
Wilson (2004) in their examination of US bank mergers over the period 1987-1999 found that 
risky asset portfolios had a positive impact on the probability of a bank engaging in mergers. 
In the present study, following Altunbas and Ibanez (2004), we use the ratio of loan loss 
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provisions to net interest revenue6 (PROVIS), highlighting the relationship between 
provisions in the profit and loss account and the net interest income over the same period.  
 
Growth  
Moore (1996) argues that a slow growing bank may attract a buyer seeking to increase the 
market value of its franchise and accelerate its growth. On the other hand, as Kocagil et al. 
(2002) point out, previous empirical research suggests that some banks with relatively high 
growth rates have experienced problems because their management and/or structure has not 
been able to deal with and sustain exceptional growth. Hence, it is possible that a troubled 
firm could itself be an attractive target for a firm with surplus resources or management 
available to help (Barnes, 1999). Hannan and Rhoades (1987) found growth to be positively 
related to inside market acquisitions and negatively related to outside market characteristics, 
although insignificant in both cases. However, Moore (1996) revealed a negative relationship 
between a bank’s growth and the acquisition probability regardless of whether the acquisition 
was in-market or out-of-market, to support his argument about the slow growing firm being an 
attractive target. We represent the influence of a bank’s growth by the annual change in the 
bank’s total assets (GROWTH).  
 
Liquidity 
A bank must maintain its ability to meet current liabilities as they become due, otherwise it 
could be seen as ineffective in liquidity management. Hence, the liquidity position of a bank 
could be an additional factor that may influence its attractiveness as an acquisition target. 
However, it is difficult to determine a priori what the effect of liquidity and the direction of its 
influence will be. The conventional view is that banks are acquired because they have moved 
                                                     
6A l t u n b a s  a n d  Ib a n e z  ( 2 0 0 4 )  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  n o n - p e r f o r m i n g  l o a n s  h a v e  a  m o r e  b a c k w a r d - l o o k i n g  
p e r s p e c t i v e  w i t h  m i s s i n g  d a t a  ( a s  w e  a l s o  e x p e r i e n c e d )  f o r  s e v e r a l  E U  c o u n t r i e s .   H e n c e ,  w e  r e l y  o n  
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into liquidity difficulties, indicating that low liquidity increases acquisition likelihood. On the 
other hand, excess liquidity may signal a lack of investment opportunities or a poor allocation 
of assets, making banks attractive targets because of their good liquidity position (i.e. the size 
of liquid assets influences acquisition). This latter view is supported by the results of 
Wheelock and Wilson (2000) who find that low liquidity makes banks less attractive targets.  
We consider three possible measures of a bank’s liquidity position. The first is the 
ratio of net loans to customers & short term funding (LOANFUND), a measure highlighting 
the association between comparatively illiquid assets (i.e. loans) and moderately stable 
funding sources (i.e. deposits and other short term funding). In other words, this measure 
reflects the extent to which the bank has lent its deposits in illiquid form: obviously, the lower 
this ratio, the more liquid the bank is. The European Central Bank report (2004) on the 
stability of the EU banking sector indicate that the share of customers’ loans in total assets 
was 50.57% in 2003, while in the same year the share of customers and other credit 
institutions deposits in total liabilities was 62.29%, thus highlighting the importance of this 
ratio.  
The second measure is the ratio of liquid assets to customers & short term funding 
(LIQFUND). The liquid assets in this measure are generally short-term assets that can be 
easily converted into cash, such as cash itself, deposits with the central bank, treasury bills, 
other government securities and interbank deposits among others. Thus, this ratio measures 
the percentage of customer & short term deposits that can be met on demand: obviously, the 
higher this ratio, the more liquid the bank is.  Hence, this measure can be considered as a 
counterpart to the first measure. 
The third measure is the ratio of net loans to total assets (LOANASS) and indicates the 
percentage of bank assets tied up in loans. This measure of liquidity has been commonly 
                                                                                                                                                                     
t h e  l o a n  l o s s  p r o v i s i o n s  t o  n e t  i n t e r e s t  r e v e n u e  r a t i o  t h a t  i s  m o s t  w i d e l y  a n d  p u b l i c l y  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h e  
E U  c o u n t r i e s ,  a s  a  p r o x y  f o r  a s s e t  q u a l i t y .  
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employed in previous studies albeit with mixed effect. Hannan and Rhoades (1987) find a 
negative effect on the acquisition likelihood (although not significant). Their argument for 
testing this effect has been that, on the one hand, a high level of loans would seem to indicate 
aggressive behavior by the target bank, while, on the other, a low level of loan activity may 
indicate a bank with conservative or complacent management, which an aggressive acquiring 
bank could turn around to increase returns.  Moore (1996) also finds a negative (and 
significant) effect in both in-market and out-of-market acquisitions (using loan to assets ratio 
excluding small firms loans). The results of Wheelock and Wilson (2000, 2004) are somewhat 
mixed (using total loans to total assets ratio), with negative (but not significant)  effect on the 
probability of acquisition in some cases, and positive but not always significant in other cases.  
 
Profitability and expenses management  
A well known hypothesis relating to M&As is that acquisitions serve to drive out bad 
management (Manne, 1965). Hannan and Rhoades (1987) test this hypothesis for US banks 
arguing that poorly managed banks are likely targets for acquirers who believe that they can 
manage more efficiently the assets of the acquired banks and thereby increase profitability. 
They find no evidence to support this hypothesis, however.  Lack of support for the inefficient 
management hypothesis is also confirmed by Hadlock et al. (1999), and Pasiouras and 
Zopounidis (2006) for Greece.  On the contrary, Moore (1996), Focarelli et al. (1999) and 
Wheelock and Wilson (2000) reveal a negative effect of profitability on the acquisition 
likelihood. Focarelli et al. (1999) and Wheelock and Wilson (2000) also find that acquisition 
probability declines with cost inefficiency.  
In this study, we employ seven measures of profitability and two cost efficiency 
measures as proxies for management performance (see Table 2).  The profitability measures 
are: (i)  net interest margin (NIM) which is the net interest income expressed as a percentage 
of earning assets, and reflects the profitability of a bank’s interest-earning business, (ii) the 
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ratio of net interest income to average total assets (REVAS), similar to NIM, but expressed as 
percentage of average total assets rather than earning assets, (iii) the ratio of other operating 
income to average assets (OTHOPINC) indicating the extent to which non-interest income 
represents a greater percentage of bank’s operating income, (iv) NOPITEMS which measures 
non-operating items & taxes as a percentage of average assets, (v) return on average assets 
(ROAA), calculated as net profit divided by average total assets and is used to measure the 
overall profitability of a bank, (vi) return on average equity (ROAE), calculated as net profit 
divided by average shareholders equity, and (vii)recurring earning power (RECEARN), 
calculated as profit before tax minus other income7 plus loan loss provisions all divided by 
average assets.  
The two cost efficiency ratios are: (i) overheads8 plus loan loss provisions as a 
proportion of total assets (EXPASS), signaling the efficiency of bank’s management 
performance regarding expenses relative to owned assets, and (ii) expenses as a proportion of 
operating income (COSTINC), a variant of EXPASS that excludes loan loss provisions from 
the nominator and uses income as the denominator. Obviously, higher COSTINC and 
EXPASS signal less efficient banks in terms of expenses management.  
 
Market Share 
A recent study of the Group of Ten (2001) points out that market power, interpreted as an 
increase in market share, is one of the most important motives for within-country, within-
segment mergers in the financial sector. Moore (1996) argues that market power can influence 
the probability of acquisition in several ways. First, there may not be in-market acquirers large 
enough to acquire a bank with a significant market share. Second, regulatory concerns about 
potential anticompetitive effects could reduce the probability of acquisition for banks with 
                                                     
7Other income corresponds to income from participating interests in affiliated enterprises, participating interests in other enterprises, other 
shares held as financial fixed assets and Extraordinary items (net) (i.e. extraordinary income minus extraordinary charges).   
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high market share. Third, in a banking market where only banks with large market share can 
effectively compete, a bank with small share is likely to be acquired, since its assets will 
become more valuable after its merger with a larger bank. Finally, in a similar manner, and 
consistent with the inefficient management hypothesis mentioned above, a bank’s small 
market share could reflect a lack of success in the market. The empirical results are mixed. 
Hannan and Rhoades (1987) find market share to be significant and positively related to the 
out-of market acquisitions, but not statistically significant in within-market acquisitions. 
Moore (1996) and Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2006), on the other hand, find market share to 
be statistically significant and negatively related with the acquisition likelihood. We 
incorporate two measures of a bank’s market share, one based on deposits (DEPSHARE) and 
the other on loans (LOANSHARE), both expressed as a proportion of the total deposits/loans 
of the banking sector in the country where the bank operates.    
 
2.2.2 Market Characteristics   
In addition to the banks’ financial characteristics discussed above, we consider nine control 
variables as proxies for market characteristics reflecting the environment in which banks 
operate. Explanations of the influence of the market on the probability of acquisition are based 
on neoclassical and behavioral corporate finance theory. Under the neoclassical theory, 
proposed by Gort (1969) (and more recently examined by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) 
among others), corporate managers react to technological, regulatory or economic shocks by 
reallocating assets through mergers and acquisitions. Under the behavioral approach,  rational 
managers take advantage of consistent pricing errors in the market by purchasing real assets 
with overvalued stock9 through mergers and acquisitions.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
8O v e r h e a d s  a r e  t h e  c o s t s  o f  r u n n i n g  b u s i n e s s ,  s u c h  a s  s t a f f  s a l a r i e s  a n d  b e n e f i t s ,  r e n t  e x p e n s e s ,  
e q u i p m e n t  e x p e n s e s  a n d  o t h e r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  e x p e n s e s .   
9
 T h e  i d e a  t h a t  s t o c k  m a r k e t  v a l u a t i o n s  s h a p e  m e r g e r  a c t i v i t y  d a t e s  b a c k  t o  N e l s o n  ( 1 9 5 9 ) ,  b u t  m o r e  
r e c e n t  s t u d i e s  e m p h a s i z i n g  t h e  b e h a v i o u r a l  a p p r o a c h  a r e  S t e i n  ( 1 9 8 8 ,  1 9 8 9 ,  1 9 9 6 ) ,  M o r c k  e t  a l .  
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To determine the influence of market characteristics, we consider the following 
measures: (i) the market return on average assets (MPROF), (ii) market growth (MGROW), 
(iii) market liquidity (MLIQ), (iv) the relative openness of the banking sector, as indicated by 
the Heritage Banking & Finance factor (BENV), (v) the change in the overall economic 
freedom, as represented by the annual change in the Heritage Economic Index score 
(OENVCH), (vi) bank claims on the private sector (CLAIMS), (vii) stock market 
capitalization (SMCGDP), (viii) the degree of market concentration within the banking sector 
(CONC), and (ix) a dummy variable (5EU) indicating whether or not the banks operate in one 
of the five principal EU banking sectors (i.e. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK).  
MPROF is an indicator of market profitability as represented by the average ROAA of 
the commercial banking industry within a country (Buch and DeLong, 2004). The rationale 
for its inclusion is based on the argument that industry level shocks affecting market 
profitability may lead to higher levels of acquisitions through restructuring. Support for this 
argument is provided by Christensen and Montgomery (1981) who show that firms in 
profitable industries tend to make more related acquisitions, while those from less profitable 
sectors turn towards unrelated inter-industry acquisitions in an effort to improve their profit 
potential. Alternatively, as pointed out by Ali-Yrkkö (2002), the entire banking industry may 
undergo restructuring in the event of deep banking crisis as witnessed in the 1990s. Finally, 
Harford (2005) documents the existence of abnormally high changes in profitability prior to 
merger waves.  
MGROW is a measure of market growth, calculated as the annual change of total 
assets in the commercial banking industry within each country.  Historical evidence seems to 
suggest that firms make acquisitions within industries with high growth rates (Chirstensen and 
Montgomery, 1981; Audretch, 1989; Schoenberg and Reeves, 1999). Additionally, as in the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
( 1 9 9 0 ) ,  S h l e i f e r  a n d  V i s h n y  ( 1 9 9 0 ) ,  B a k e r  a n d  W u r g l e r  ( 2 0 0 0 ,  2 0 0 2 ,  2 0 0 4 ) , B a k e r  e t  a l .  ( 2 0 0 3 ) ,  J e n t e r  
( 2 0 0 5 ) ,  P o l k  a n d  S a p i e n z a  ( 2 0 0 3 ) .  
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case of low profitability, low industry growth may suggest the need for industrial 
restructuring. In the banking sector, Hannan and Rhoades (1987) find that market growth is 
negatively (albeit insignificantly) related to in-market acquisitions and positively (but in most 
cases insignificantly) related to out-of-market acquisitions. Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2006) 
also find market growth to be negatively (but not significantly) related to the probability of 
acquisition. Finally, Harford (2005) reports abnormally high growth measures (e.g. 
employees, sales) prior to waves.  
MLIQ is the average liquidity in the market, calculated by the ratio of liquid assets to 
customer & short term funding for the commercial banking sector in each country. Harford 
(2005) supports the neoclassical explanation that mergers occur in response to specific 
industry shocks that require large-scale reallocation of assets, but the shocks are not enough 
on their own.  A corollary to this view is that when capital liquidity is high industry-specific 
shocks would predict merger waves. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) make a similar argument in 
their study of asset liquidity, showing that in order for transactions to occur, buyers who 
intend to employ the asset in its first-best use must be relatively unconstrained. Schlingemann 
et al. (2002) show that industry-specific asset liquidity is important in determining which 
assets will be divested. 
OENVCH is the annual change in the Heritage Foundation Economic Index score for 
each country. The index takes values10 from 1 to 5, signifying an economic environment or a 
set of policies ranging from those most conductive to economic freedom (score 1), to least 
conductive (score 5). The empirical literature on the determinants of bank mergers generally 
supports the hypothesis that deregulation has a substantial impact on merger decisions 
                                                     
10
 A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  H e r i t a g e  F o u n d a t i o n  t h e  s c o r e  f o r  e a c h  c o u n t r y ,  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  5 0  
v a r i a b l e s ,  t h a t  f a l l  i n t o  f o l l o w i n g  1 0  m a i n  c a t e g o r i e s :  ( 1 )  b a n k i n g  a n d  f i n a n c e ,  ( 2 )  t r a d e  p o l i c y ,  ( 3 )  
f i s c a l  b u r d e n  o f  g o v e r n m e n t ,  ( 4 )  g o v e r n m e n t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  e c o n o m y ,  ( 5 )  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y ,  ( 6 )  
c a p i t a l  f l o w s  a n d  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t ,  ( 7 )  w a g e s  a n d  p r i c e s ,  ( 8 )  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s ,  ( 9 )  r e g u l a t i o n ,  a n d  
( 1 0 )  i n f o r m a l  m a r k e t  a c t i v i t y .  
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(Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998; Saunders, 1999). Schoenberg and Reeves (1999) also find that 
deregulation has a positive impact on acquisition activity within UK industries. 
BENV is a score measure based on the Heritage Banking and Finance Factor, 
reflecting the relative openness of a country’s banking and financial system. Banks operate in 
a highly regulated industry and therefore the banking and regulatory environment can have an 
important impact on their decisions. The score takes the values 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 that correspond 
to: very low, low, moderate, high and very high restrictions on banks, respectively11.  
CLAIMS is the ratio of bank claims on the private sector to GDP, typically used to 
capture the size of the banking system (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001; Buch and DeLong, 2004; 
Diaz et al., 2004). Buch and DeLong (2004) in their examination of cross-border M&As find 
that the size of the target country’s banking system has a negative impact on the probability of 
bank mergers suggesting that banks do not invest in markets that have established a relatively 
large banking sector.  
 SMCGDP is the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio that measures 
financial deepening (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999; Manchin, 2004; Giovani, 2005). 
Giovani (2005) points out that financially deep markets can provide firms with access to 
capital necessary to undertake investment projects, which might be used to good effect in 
international M&As. Le Bras and Rawcliffe (2004) argue that a slowdown in stock markets 
might not only put pressures on banks revenues but also affect their ability to raise capital for 
acquisitions.  
CONC is a measure of concentration in the banking sector, calculated as the total 
assets held by the five largest commercial banks in the country divided by the total assets of 
                                                     
11
 T h i s  s c o r e  i s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f a c t o r s :  ( 1 )  w h e t h e r  f o r e i g n  b a n k s  a n d  
f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s  f i r m s  a r e  a b l e  t o  o p e r a t e  f r e e l y ,  ( 2 )  h o w  d i f f i c u l t  i t  i s  t o  o p e n  d o m e s t i c  b a n k s  a n d  
o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s  f i r m s ,  ( 3 )  h o w  h e a v i l y  r e g u l a t e d  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m  i s ,  ( 4 )  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  
s t a t e - o w n e d  b a n k s ,  ( 5 )  w h e t h e r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  i n f l u e n c e s  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  c r e d i t ,  a n d  ( 6 )  w h e t h e r  
b a n k s  a r e  f r e e  t o  p r o v i d e  c u s t o m e r s  w i t h  i n s u r a n c e  a n d  i n v e s t  i n  s e c u r i t i e s .  T h e  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  B a n k i n g  
a n d  F i n a n c e  F a c t o r  a r e  n o t  c o n t i n u o u s ,  a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  E c o n o m i c  In d e x ,  a n d  w e  r a r e l y  o b s e r v e  
a n y  d i f f e r e n c e s  f r o m  o n e  y e a r  t o  a n o t h e r .  W e  t h e r e f o r e  u s e d  t h e  a s s i g n e d  s c o r e s ,  t o  c a p t u r e  t h e  d e g r e e  
o f  r e g u l a t i o n ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  a n n u a l  c h a n g e .    
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all commercial banks in the country. Regulatory concerns about potential anticompetitive 
consequences suggest that market concentration would have a negative effect on the 
probability of being acquired. Hannan and Rhoades (1987) find a negative and significant 
effect of concentration on the probability of in-market acquisitions, and a positive but 
insignificant effect on out-of market acquisitions. Moore (1996) finds no relationship between 
concentration and acquisition likelihood for in-market acquisitions, but a positive and 
significant one for out-of market acquisitions. Wheelock and Wilson (2004) and Pasiouras 
and Zopounidis (2006) both find a negative relationship between concentration and 
acquisition likelihood.  
Finally, we incorporate a dummy variable (5EU) indicating whether the bank is 
operating in one of the 5 large EU banking sectors (5EU =1) or not (5EU=0). This distinction 
is drawn on two considerations.  First, the study of Group of Ten (2001) indicates that the 
nature of acquisition activity and the main motivations for acquisition may differ between 
countries. Second, the European Central Bank (2000) reports that specific developments in 
individual EU countries or regions influence M&As. Since the development of the banking 
sectors in the 5 principal banking sectors (i.e. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK) differs to a 
large extent from the smaller sectors of the EU, inclusion of the intercept dummy in the 
logistic regression allows for the influence of unobserved characteristics different from those 
that are generally common to both sets of countries.  
 
2.3 Estimation  
A binomial logistic regression model of the following form is estimated to examine 
the determinants of acquisition in a multivariate environment, where the probability of 
acquisition is given by:  
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where b0 is the intercept term, b1, b2 ,…, bn are the regression coefficients of 
independent variables, x1, x2, …, xn are the values of the  independent variables. As noted 
earlier, the dependent variable y is equal to zero if the bank is non-acquired (y=0) and one if it 
is acquired (y=1). 
 The estimation of a logit model can be problematic when there are a few 
observations from one outcome (i.e. acquired banks) relative to the other (i.e. non-acquired 
banks), because the “information content” of such a sample is then small biasing the 
parameter estimates (Palepu, 1986). Hence, we have proportionately weighted the 
observations to correct for the imbalance in the choice based sample12.   
 
 
 
3 .  Empirical  results   
Table  3  presents  descr ip t ive  s ta t i s t i cs  (mean and  s tandard  devia t ion)  and  the  
resu l t s  of  a  Kruska l -Wal l i s  t es t  of  means  d i f fe rences  be tween acqui red  and  non-
acqui red  banks .   
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 T h e  f o l l o w i n g  f o r m u l a  i s  u s e d :  W e i g h t i n g  f o r  G r o u p  0  ( N o n - a c q u i r e d )  =  ( 1 / N 0 )  *  [ ( N 0  + N 1 ) / 2 ] .  
W e i g h t i n g  f o r  G r o u p  1  ( A c q u i r e d )  = ( 1 / N 1 )  *  [ ( N 0  + N 1 ) / 2 ] .  H e n c e ,  t h e  w e i g h t  f o r  n o n - a c q u i r e d  b a n k s  i s  
( 1  / 5 0 4 )  *  [ ( 5 0 4 + 1 6 8 ) / 2 ]   = 0 . 6 7 ,  a n d  t h e  o n e  f o r  a c q u i r e d  b a n k s  i s  ( 1 / 1 6 8 )  *  [ ( 1 6 8 + 5 0 4 ) / 2 ]   = 2 .   
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics and Kruskal-Wallis test 
 A c q u i r e d  N o n - a c q u i r e d  K r u s k a l - W a l l i s  
 M e a n  S t d e v  M e a n  S t d e v  C h i - s q u a r e  p - v a l u e  
 
P a n e l  A :  B a n k ’ s  f i n a n c i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s   
E Q A S  1 . 8 7 9  2 . 0 8 3  2 . 2 4 1  2 . 5 4 6  6 . 5 7 2  0 . 0 1 0  
E Q LO A N  3 . 0 2 9  4 . 4 9 6  4 . 4 2 5  1 1 . 5 8 2  1 . 5 3 6  0 . 2 1 5  
E Q C U S T  2 . 1 3 8  3 . 6 2 8  2 . 6 4 8  7 . 1 6 1  2 . 7 6 1  0 . 0 9 7  
E Q LIA B  2 . 2 7 8  3 . 5 1 8  2 . 9 0 8  7 . 7 5 3  6 . 6 3 9  0 . 0 1 0  
C A P LIA B  1 . 7 8 0  2 . 4 8 1  2 . 1 9 5  4 . 6 4 6  9 . 1 3 7  0 . 0 0 3  
S IZ E  0 . 9 1 2  2 . 5 6 8  0 . 9 3 3  3 . 5 1 8  0 . 0 1 6  0 . 8 9 8  
G R O W T H  1 . 3 8 4  3 9 . 3 7 7  3 . 4 0 1  2 2 . 8 7 8  8 . 1 3 4  0 . 0 0 4  
P R O V IS  0 . 8 7 4  1 . 5 7 5  0 . 9 9 8  1 . 9 2 1  1 . 4 5 5  0 . 2 2 8  
N IM  1 . 5 9 7  1 . 1 5 2  1 . 7 7 5  1 . 6 6 7  0 . 5 0 8  0 . 4 7 6  
R E V A S  1 . 6 3 5  1 . 1 9 2  1 . 8 0 7  1 . 6 7 1  0 . 5 7 1  0 . 4 5 0  
O T H O P IN C  1 . 3 9 1  2 . 6 7 9  1 . 7 1 4  3 . 0 3 5  1 . 0 0 1  0 . 3 1 7  
N O P IT E M S  - 0 . 4 0 4  3 . 0 5 0  0 . 2 3 8  1 4 . 6 3 3  1 . 5 7 1  0 . 2 1 0  
R O A A  - 0 . 2 0 0  1 3 . 1 6 1  2 . 3 6 1  1 0 . 7 9 9  1 8 . 1 1 2  0 . 0 0 0  
R O A E  0 . 0 2 5  7 . 1 7 7  0 . 8 8 0  3 . 8 6 7  1 1 . 4 0 4  0 . 0 0 1  
R E C E A R N  0 . 8 9 7  1 . 2 6 3  1 . 6 3 5  2 . 6 9 5  1 0 . 6 1 6  0 . 0 0 1  
E X P A S S  1 . 6 9 1  1 . 4 3 2  1 . 7 1 6  1 . 6 4 5  0 . 3 8 4  0 . 5 3 6  
C O S T IN C  1 . 1 4 4  0 . 4 4 2  0 . 9 7 5  0 . 4 3 2  3 0 . 7 2 2  0 . 0 0 0  
LO A N A S  1 . 0 1 2  0 . 5 6 2  1 . 0 2 8  0 . 5 8 1  0 . 0 8 2  0 . 7 7 4  
LO A N F U N D  0 . 9 7 4  0 . 5 7 3  0 . 9 7 9  0 . 6 7 3  0 . 2 0 1  0 . 6 5 4  
LIQ F U N D  1 . 2 1 6  1 . 6 4 8  1 . 2 7 7  1 . 2 1 2  1 . 2 0 9  0 . 2 7 2  
LO A N S H A R E  1 . 1 9 0  3 . 1 5 1  1 . 3 7 3  4 . 9 8 3  0 . 4 7 4  0 . 4 9 1  
D E P S H A R E  1 . 3 7 2  3 . 6 3 4  1 . 3 8 1  5 . 1 4 6  0 . 9 6 1  0 . 3 2 7  
 
P a n e l  B :  M a r k e t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s   
M P R O F  0 . 5 6 3  0 . 3 1 2  0 . 5 3 2  0 . 2 7 1  0 . 4 7 5  0 . 4 9 1  
M G R O W  9 . 9 4 1  9 . 4 8 0  1 2 . 7 2 9  9 . 9 3 7  7 . 9 3 2  0 . 0 0 5  
M LIQ  2 8 . 4 3 5  8 . 5 9 3  2 8 . 3 2 4  6 . 5 6 6  0 . 8 8  0 . 3 4 8  
O E N V C H  - 0 . 0 1 0  0 . 0 2 5  - 0 . 0 0 5  0 . 0 2 6  3 . 9 4 5  0 . 0 4 7  
B E N V  2 . 2 5 5  0 . 2 2 7  2 . 1 9 5  0 . 2 1 5  4 . 0 6 4  0 . 0 4 4  
C LA IM S  1 . 9 0 9  4 . 9 0 3  2 . 0 7 2  5 . 4 8 0  3 . 3 7  0 . 0 6 6  
S M C G D P  0 . 9 7 7  0 . 9 1 1  1 . 1 7 1  1 . 1 5 5  4 . 1 6 3  0 . 0 4 1  
C O N C 5  6 7 . 2 0 0  1 7 . 1 9 6  6 8 . 1 6 8  1 7 . 0 1 9  0 . 6 7 3  0 . 4 1 2  
 
P a n e l  C :  C a t e g o r i c a l  v a r i a b l e s   
 A c q u i r e d  N o n - a c q u i r e d      
5 E U  1 0 7  3 3 6      
N o n  - 5 E U  6 1  1 6 8      
N o t e s :  V a r i a b l e s  a r e  d e f i n e d  i n  Ta b l e  2  
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test reveals the existence of significant differences between the 
financial characteristics of acquired and non-acquired banks in terms of capital strength, 
growth, profitability, and expenses management. More specifically, acquired banks are less 
well capitalized as revealed by their relatively high mean values of EQAS, EQLIAB and 
CAPLIAB. Additionally, GROWTH is significantly lower for the acquired banks, indicating 
 25  
that these slow growing banks may have attracted acquirers seeking to increase their market 
value (Moore, 1996). Acquired banks have also significantly lower means for ROAA, ROAE 
and RECEARN, indicating that they have under-performed in terms of these profitability 
ratios. Also COST is higher on average for the acquired banks, indicating relative cost 
inefficiency in terms of expenses management. Turning to measures of market characteristics, 
five of the nine ratios have significantly different means values. First, MGROWTH is lower 
for the acquired banks, suggesting that these banks may be facing acquisitions as a means of 
restructuring the corporate control market. Second, OENVCH is higher for the acquired banks 
(in absolute terms), suggesting that banks in countries with higher changes in economic 
freedom are more likely to be acquired. Fourth, restrictions in the banking industry (BENV) 
appear to be higher for acquired banks. Finally, bank claims on the private sector to GDP 
(CLAIMS) and stock market capitalization to GDP (SMGDP) are also significantly lower for 
the acquired banks. We also observe that the proportion of the acquired banks in the five 
banking sectors is lower than in the other ten banking sectors (31.85% in the former 
corresponding to 36.31% in the latter, as a percentage of the non-acquired banks in the same 
sector)13. 
A comparison of the sample means has revealed some useful insights into the 
characteristics distinguishing the two categories of banks, but to assess the significance of 
factors affecting the likelihood of bank acquisition requires estimation of a logistic regression 
model. Prior to estimation, we employed principal component analysis (PCA) with varimax 
rotation on the set of 22 bank specific ratios in order to eliminate the effects of 
multicolinearity and the overlapping nature of some of these variables14. Table 4 shows the 
                                                     
13A l t h o u g h  w e  h a v e  n o  r e a s o n  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  o u r  s a m p l e  i s  b i a s e d  t o w a r d s  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  l e s s  ( m o r e )  
a c q u i r e d  b a n k s  f r o m  t h e  l a r g e  ( s m a l l )  b a n k i n g  s e c t o r s  a n d  t h e  o p p o s i t e  f o r  n o n - a c q u i r e d  b a n k s ,  a n y  
p o t e n t i a l  b i a s e s  s h o u l d  b e  k e p t  i n  m i n d  w h i l e  i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  r e s u l t s .  
14P r i n c i p a l  C o m p o n e n t  A n a l y s i s  ( P C A )  a n d  F a c t o r  A n a l y s i s  ( F A )  a r e  t w o  c l a s s i c  w a y s ,  c o m m o n l y  u s e d  
i n  f i n a n c e  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g ,  o f  r e d u c i n g  a  h i g h  n u m b e r  o f  c o r r e l a t e d  v a r i a b l e s  d o w n  t o  a  n e w  r e d u c e d  
s e t  o f  u n c o r r e l a t e d  v a r i a b l e s .  F A  p r o d u c e s  f a c t o r s  w h i l e  P C A  p r o d u c e s  c o m p o n e n t s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  
p r o c e s s e s  a r e  s i m i l a r  e x c e p t  i n  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  t h e  o b s e r v e d  c o r r e l a t i o n  m a t r i x  f o r  e x t r a c t i o n  a n d  t h e  
u n d e r l y i n g  t h e o r y  ( T a b a c h n i c k  a n d  F i d e l l ,  2 0 0 1 ) .  T h i s  i s  w h y  r e s e a r c h e r s  u s u a l l y  d o  n o t  d i s t i n g u i s h  
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loadings of the PCA that resulted in the extraction of seven components with eigenvalues 
greater than unity. These components explain about 74% of the total variance in the sample 
and appear to represent the dimensions of capital strength, interest margin, market power, 
liquidity, profitability, expenses management and asset quality. There are two possible ways 
of incorporating the results of PCA in the logistic regression model. The first is to select the 
individual variables from each of the seven components that have the highest loadings. The 
second is to use the principal components scores, essentially a reduced set of seven 
uncorrelated variables representing the aforementioned dimensions. We rely on the second 
approach, as in Poon et al. (1999), Fields et al. (2004) and Gaganis et al. (2006), for four 
reasons. First, since principal component scores are weighted combinations of correlated 
variables, they are likely to be more reliable, and generally of higher quality than the 
individual variables (Fielder, 1993). Second, we avoid the judicious but arbitrary selection of 
individual variables. Third, the information content of the scores is obviously more 
representative than that of the individual variables. Fourth, we can be confident that the 
principal components are uncorrelated, whereas the individual variables making up the 
components might still be correlated to some degree.  
            
                                                                                                                                                                     
P C A  f r o m  F A .  M a t h e m a t i c a l l y ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  P C A  a n d  F A  i s  i n  t h e  v a r i a n c e  t h a t  i s  a n a l y z e d .  
In  P C A  a l l  t h e  v a r i a n c e  i n  t h e  o b s e r v e d  v a r i a b l e s  i s  a n a l y z e d ,  w h i l e  i n  F A  o n l y  t h e  s h a r e d  v a r i a n c e  i s  
a n a l y z e d .  E x a m p l e s  o f  p r e v i o u s  s t u d i e s  t h a t  u s e d  P C A  o r  F A  a r e :  P i n c h e s  e t  a l .  ( 1 9 7 3 ) ,  B a r n e s  ( 1 9 9 0 ) ,  
P o o n  e t  a l .  ( 1 9 9 9 ) ,  E m e l  e t  a l .  ( 2 0 0 3 ) ,  F i e l d s  e t  a l .  ( 2 0 0 4 ) ,  G a g a n i s  e t  a l .  ( 2 0 0 6 ) .       
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  Table 4- Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of financial variables  
                            C o mp o n e n t s  
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
C AP LI AB  0 . 9 7 9  0 . 0 6 7  - 0 . 0 2 4  - 0 . 0 6 4  0 . 0 3 9  0 . 0 1 8  - 0 . 0 0 3  
E Q LI AB  0 . 9 7 6  0 . 0 3 8  - 0 . 0 2 3  - 0 . 0 5 9  0 . 0 3 9  0 . 0 1 4  - 0 . 0 1 5  
E Q C U S T 0 . 9 5 1  0 . 0 5 2  - 0 . 0 1 6  - 0 . 0 9 0  -
0 . 0 0 1  
- 0 . 0 6 8  - 0 . 0 0 4  
E Q AS  0 . 8 1 5  0 . 1 6 5  - 0 . 0 9 8  - 0 . 1 3 1  0 . 1 4 0  0 . 0 2 7  - 0 . 0 3 1  
N I M  0 . 1 1 5  0 . 9 1 6  - 0 . 0 8 3  0 . 2 2 0  0 . 0 3 2  - 0 . 0 9 6  - 0 . 0 5 2  
N E TI N TR E  0 . 1 0 3  0 . 9 0 9  - 0 . 0 9 1  0 . 2 3 8  0 . 0 2 4  - 0 . 1 1 0  - 0 . 0 5 9  
E X P  0 . 1 3 1  0 . 7 7 2  - 0 . 0 5 8  - 0 . 1 1 0  0 . 2 3 8  0 . 3 7 9  0 . 1 7 2  
M AR K D E P  -
0 . 0 4 5  
- 0 . 0 5 6  0 . 9 6 4  0 . 0 1 4  -
0 . 0 0 4  
- 0 . 0 0 7  - 0 . 0 1 2  
M AR K LO  -
0 . 0 3 8  
- 0 . 0 5 3  0 . 9 5 6  0 . 0 5 4  0 . 0 0 0  - 0 . 0 1 6  - 0 . 0 1 8  
TA -
0 . 0 4 7  
- 0 . 0 6 8  0 . 8 0 8  0 . 0 2 3  -
0 . 0 0 3  
- 0 . 0 0 7  0 . 0 3 3  
LO AN AS S  -
0 . 0 1 9  
0 . 2 8 3  - 0 . 0 1 3  0 . 8 6 0  -
0 . 0 3 2  
- 0 . 0 7 3  0 . 0 4 7  
LO AN C U S T 0 . 1 1 3  0 . 2 4 1  0 . 0 1 6  0 . 8 1 1  -
0 . 0 3 0  
- 0 . 0 9 2  0 . 1 3 6  
LI Q C U S T 0 . 2 9 3  - 0 . 0 0 8  - 0 . 0 2 5  - 0 . 6 6 9  0 . 0 8 2  0 . 0 0 8  0 . 0 6 4  
E Q LO AN  0 . 1 5 9  0 . 1 0 2  - 0 . 0 7 0  - 0 . 6 0 5  0 . 0 2 0  - 0 . 1 5 5  0 . 0 9 1  
R O A 0 . 1 4 7  - 0 . 0 5 2  - 0 . 0 1 6  - 0 . 0 0 2  0 . 8 4 3  - 0 . 0 0 1  - 0 . 0 8 3  
O TH O P E  0 . 1 3 9  0 . 2 5 6  - 0 . 0 2 1  - 0 . 2 9 2  0 . 7 4 0  0 . 2 2 3  0 . 1 4 6  
R O E  -
0 . 0 3 6  
- 0 . 0 3 1  0 . 0 3 5  0 . 0 2 7  0 . 6 9 1  - 0 . 0 1 9  - 0 . 1 0 9  
R E C U R  0 . 0 0 1  0 . 3 8 3  - 0 . 0 4 3  - 0 . 0 4 5  0 . 6 7 4  - 0 . 3 5 4  0 . 1 0 4  
C O S T -
0 . 0 7 8  
0 . 0 8 7  - 0 . 0 0 5  - 0 . 1 3 5  -
0 . 1 7 2  
0 . 7 5 6  - 0 . 2 8 3  
N O P I TE M S   0 . 0 5 6  - 0 . 0 9 4  - 0 . 0 2 9  0 . 1 5 7  0 . 1 1 5  0 . 5 7 3  0 . 3 0 3  
P R O V  -
0 . 0 0 7  
0 . 1 8 3  0 . 0 8 3  - 0 . 0 0 7  -
0 . 1 5 5  
- 0 . 0 9 9  0 . 7 8 4  
TAC H A -
0 . 0 3 2  
- 0 . 0 8 8  - 0 . 0 4 0  - 0 . 0 1 0  0 . 0 2 7  0 . 0 4 7  0 . 5 1 6  
N o t e :  Lo a d i n g s  a b o v e  0 . 6 5  ( i n  a b s o l u t e  t e r ms )  a r e  d e n o t e d  wi t h  b o l d .  
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To consider the relative influence of bank specific and market characteristics, we 
estimate two versions of the logistic regression model, with results shown in Table 5. Model 1 
includes the 7 principal component scores only, representing bank specific influences, while 
Model 2 allows for the additional influence of different market characteristics15. Because of 
the specific nature of the market characteristics measures it was desired to include them 
individually rather than their principal component scores, and doing so does not undermine 
the significance of bank specific effects. Indeed, the overall explanatory power (Nagelkerke 
R2) increases from 7.5% (Model 1) to 13.7% (Model 2), and despite the insignificance of 
some measures, the chi-square values confirm the overall significance of both regressions.  
Among the bank specific influences, the first principal component (COMPONENT 1) 
corresponds to capital strength and has the expected negative sign in both regressions, 
although its effect is not significant as found in prior US studies (e.g. Hannan and Rhoades, 
1987; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000).  Thus, despite the mean differences in some of the capital 
strength measures, the overall influence is not strong enough to suggest that less well-
capitalized banks in the EU are more likely to be acquired.       
The coefficients of COMPONENT 2 (net interest margin), COMPONENT 3 (market 
power in terms of bank size and market share) and COMPONENT 4 (liquidity and loan 
activity) are also insignificant, and accord with the lack of significance in mean differences of 
the underlying variables in the sample for the two groups of banks. The apparent 
insignificance of the influence of market power and size is at odds with the view held by 
practitioners in the Group of Ten (2001) report which ranked these factors above others in 
                                                     
15W e  a l s o  e s t i m a t e d  b o t h  t h e  m o d e l s  w i t h  c o u n t r y  s p e c i f i c  d u m m i e s  a n d  t i m e  d u m m i e s ,  a n d  f o u n d  t h e m  
m o s t l y  i n s i g n i f i c a n t ,  w i t h  l i t t l e  o r  n o  i m p r o v e m e n t  i n  t h e  e x p l a n a t o r y  p o w e r .   O n l y  t i m e  d u m m i e s  f o r  
2 0 0 0  a n d  2 0 0 2  w e r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  1 0 %  l e v e l ,  w i t h  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  o n  a c q u i s i t i o n  l i k e l i h o o d .  S e e  
f o o t n o t e  1 6  b e l o w  f o r  s u m m a r y  o f  r e s u l t s  w i t h  c o u n t r y  d u m m i e s .   T h e  r e s u l t s  a r e  n o t  r e p o r t e d  b u t  a r e  
a v a i l a b l e  f r o m  t h e  a u t h o r s  u p o n  r e q u e s t .   
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their investigation of M&A trends in some of the EU countries. But the insignificant influence 
of liquidity and loan activity is, consistent with the findings of Hannan and Rhoades (1987) 
and Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2006).  
 COMPONENTS 5 (profitability), 6 (expenses management) and 7 (asset 
quality) are all significant, with profitability and asset quality being negatively and expenses 
management positively related to bank acquisition likelihood. Hence, our results show that 
less profitable and less cost efficient banks are more likely to be acquired, which is at odds 
with the results of Hannan and Rhoades (1987) and Hadlock et al. (1999), but consistent with 
others that find support for the inefficient management hypothesis (e.g. Moore, 1996; 
Wheelock and Wilson, 2000). Cyree et al. (2000) also find a negative and significant impact 
of labour costs (salary expenses) on the growth of US banks. Furthermore, Focarelli et al. 
(1999) finds profitability to be negatively and cost efficiency to be positively related to the 
acquisition probability of Italian banks, although Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2006) find neither 
of these influences significant with Greek banks.  Finally, the negative and significant 
influence of asset quality indicates that EU banks with less risky asset portfolios are more 
likely to be acquired, consistent with Wheelock and Wilson (2000) who report that US banks 
with relatively high non-performing loan ratios were less attractive takeover targets.  
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Table 5- Logistic Regression Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficient Wald Coefficient Wald 
Constant -0.069 0.739 1.217 2.212 
COMPONENT 1 -0.116 1.281 -0.099 0.942 
COMPONENT 2 -0.097 1.124 -0.041 0.179 
COMPONENT 3 -0.006 0.005 -0.027 0.09 
COMPONENT 4 0.030 0.116 0.001 0.000 
COMPONENT 5 -0.436 12.055*** -0.426 11.522*** 
COMPONENT 6 0.362 13.481*** 0.336 11.504*** 
COMPONENT 7 -0.194 4.75** -0.191 4.536** 
MPROF   0.423 1.072 
MGROW   -0.030 9.669*** 
MLIQ   -0.002 0.017 
OENVCH   -8.228 5.471** 
BENV   0.229 2.353 
CLAIMS   -0.049 2.957* 
SMCGDP   -0.148 1.505 
CONC   -0.015 3.918** 
5EU   -0.645 5.411** 
Chi-square 39.152  72.584  
Nagelkerke R2 0.075  0.137  
Notes: Variables are defined in Table 2. *** Statistical significant at the 1% level,  
** Statistical significant at the 5% level, *Statistical significant at the 10% level 
 
Turning to measures of market characteristics, we find that concentration (CONC) has 
a significantly negative influence on bank acquisition likelihood, consistent with most US 
studies (and Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2006) for Greece). A possible explanation for this 
might be, as suggested by Wheelock and Wilson (2000, 2004), that regulatory concerns about 
potential anticompetitive consequences might be having an adverse impact on acquisition 
attempts. The significantly negative influence of MGROW may support the neoclassical 
assertion that acquisitions serve as a means of restructuring the EU banking sectors with 
relatively low growth. The significant negative influence of OENVCH suggests that banks 
operating in countries that experience greater economic freedom are less prone to acquisition. 
However, acquisitions do not seem to be directly affected by regulatory restrictions in the 
banking sector16 (BENV). The significance of the 5EU dummy seems to suggest that banks 
                                                     
16
 T h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  t r e a t e d  w i t h  s o m e  c a u t i o n .  A s  p r e v i o u s l y  m e n t i o n e d ,  B E N V  t a k e  t h e  
v a l u e s  o f  1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,  5  a n d  i s  n o t  a  c o n t i n u o u s  v a r i a b l e .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  a n  a g g r e g a t e  i n d e x  
t h a t  c a p t u r e s  s e v e r a l  r e g u l a t i o n s .  H e n c e  t h e  v a l u e s  d o  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  c h a n g e  f r o m  y e a r  t o  y e a r  o r  
f r o m  c o u n t r y  t o  c o u n t r y  a n d  m a y  n o  a l l o w  t h e  p r o p e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  r e g u l a t i o n s  o n  
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operating in the 5 large banking sectors are less prone to be acquired, consistent with the view 
that banks tend not to invest in markets with large banking sectors (Buch and De Long, 
2004)17. While this may be surprising at first instance, it is in fact consistent with our choice 
based sample. Finally, stock market capitalization (SMCGDP) and market liquidity (MLIQ) 
do not have a significant impact on the acquisition likelihood while CLAIMS is significant 
only at the 10% level.  
 
4. Conclusions  
The EU banking industry has experienced a large number of M&As during the last 
fifteen years. Yet, apart from a few exceptions relating to specific countries, the literature 
associated with this development in the EU has so far been limited on the investigation of 
specific determinants of M&As, focusing instead on the impact of M&As on the operating 
performance of banks, the effect of M&A announcements on the share prices of the merger 
banks, and the impact on the takeover premium. The present paper contributes to the literature 
by investigating the determinants of acquisition likelihood of commercial banks operating in 
the EU banking industry, distinguishing between bank-specific and market related factors.  In 
doing so, we regard the EU banking industry as essentially operating in the single market and 
ignore factors affecting cross-border M&As, such as information costs and asymmetries 
(Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001; Buch and De Long, 2004), regulatory and accounting 
differences influencing shareholder protection (Rossi and Volpin, 2004), and technological 
shocks (Harford, 2005).   
                                                                                                                                                                     
b a n k s  M & A s .  A  m o r e  a p p r o p r i a t e  a p p r o a c h  w o u l d  b e  t o  d i s a g g r e g a t e  t h i s  i n d e x  i n t o  t h e  s e v e r a l  
c o m p o n e n t s  u s e d  f o r  i t s  c a l c u l a t i o n  a n d  e x a m i n e  i n d i v i d u a l l y  e a c h  o n e  o f  t h e m .  
17W i t h  i n d i v i d u a l  c o u n t r y  s p e c i f i c  d u m m i e s  i n c l u d e d  i n  p l a c e  o f  t h e  5 E U ,  w e  f o u n d  t h a t  C O N C ,  
C LA IM S  a n d  O E N V C H  b e c a m e  i n s i g n i f i c a n t ,  w h e r e a s  d u m m i e s  f o r  B e l g i u m ,  F i n l a n d  a n d  G r e e c e  w e r e  
s i g n i f i c a n t  ( w i t h  a  p o s i t i v e  s i g n )  o n l y  a t  t h e  1 0 %  l e v e l .   O t h e r w i s e ,  t h e r e  w e r e  n o  s i g n i f i c a n t  
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  r e s u l t s .  
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Our sample consisted of 168 banks acquired over the period 1998-2002 combined with 
504 non-acquired ones, operating in 15 EU countries that represented the single market during 
the sample period of study. An initial set of 22 financial variables measuring various aspects 
of banks’ performance and 9 variables covering basic market characteristics were initially 
considered. The financial variables were subject to principal component analysis in order to 
reduce the effects of multicollinearity and the overlapping nature of some of the variables. 
Seven principal components were extracted, representing the dimensions of capital strength, 
interest margin, market power, liquidity, profitability, expenses management, and asset 
quality. Two versions of a logistic regression model were estimated: the first using only the 7 
principal component scores, and the second adding the 9 variables measuring market 
characteristics. . 
Our results are consistent with Wheelock and Wilson (2000) in that banks with less 
risky portfolios are more likely to be acquired.  We also find that less profitable and less cost 
efficient banks are more likely to be acquired, which accord with the inefficient management 
hypothesis (Moore, 1996; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000) and what Focarelli et al. (1999) also 
found for Italian bank acquisitions. Moreover, industry concentration (CONC) has a negative 
impact on bank acquisition likelihood, consistent with most US studies (Hannan and Rhoades, 
1987; Hadlock et al. 1999); Wheelock and Wilson, 2000, 2004) and what Pasiouras and 
Zopounidis (2006) also found for Greece. We find a significant negative influence of market 
growth (MGROW), supporting the neoclassical interpretation that acquisitions serve as a 
means of restructuring those EU banking sectors with lower growth. Our finding, however, 
show that acquisitions do not seem to be affected by regulatory restrictions in the banking 
sector, the level of stock market capitalization, industry liquidity or market profitability, while 
the size of the banking sector had only marginal effects on bank acquisitions. 
Future research could extend our study in several directions. First, the present study 
has, with respect to banks’ specific characteristics, restricted itself to the use of financial 
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variables, owing to data availability. It is hoped that future research will take into account 
non-financial factors, such as management experience or quality. Second, given that banking 
is considered of the most regulated industries it would be worthwhile to investigate further the 
impact of regulatory restrictions on M&As. While the aggregated index that we used in our 
study was not significant, examination of individual factors such as restriction on bank 
activities, regulations on entry, diversification guidelines, and government ownership could 
perhaps affect our results differently. Third, we propose to estimate separate models for 
several larger EU banking sectors in order to determine factors influencing cross-border 
M&As, possibly with a sufficiently large sample size that could also make possible the 
estimation of models for large and small banks. Finally, a comparison of the determinants of 
cross-border banks acquisitions incorporating countries, such as the US, Asia and Australia, 
over a common sample period would be worthwhile extension to our study.  
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